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ices of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
INTRODUCTION
After the Supreme Court held in Monroe v. Pape' that cities were not subject
to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 19832 because they were not "persons" within the mean-
ing of the Civil Rights Act of 187 1,3 one suffering a deprivation of some constitu-
tional right had no cause of action against the city itself; although the individual-
employee of the city responsible for the wrongful act could be held liable. 4 If the
applicable state statute permitted, the aggrieved party could bring suit against
the local government or the individuals responsible in a state court.5 However,
if a federal forum was chosen to adjudicate the alleged infringement of a con-
stitutional right 6 and since the action could lie only against the individual em-
ployee, there was the possibility that the plaintiff would be without a remedy in
the event the individual was protected either by some form of immunity7 or by
being "judgment-proof."8 Therefore a plaintiff; such as the one in Monroe, who
was the victim of an illegal search and seizure by city police; 9 could be left to
shoulder any loss resulting from the denial of his constitutional rights. The
harshness of this result led commentators to urge that municipalities bear the
burden of compensation for violations of constitutional rights rather than the
victim. 0 But the "nonperson" rule remained and was extended to other state and
local instrumentalities by the lower federal courts.''
However in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New
York,12 the Supreme court reexamined the "nonperson" rule of Monroe that
granted cities absolute immunity, and reversed this holding of Monroe conclud-
1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. Act of April 20, 1971, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
4. Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 GEO. L. J. 1483, 1485 (1976-77).
5. See note 58 infra.
6. If a civil action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, original jurisdiction of the federal
courts is invoked by 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). Subsection (3) gives the court jurisdiction:
To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
7. See note 101 infra and accompanying text.
8. Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S.
CALIF. L. REV. 131 (1972).
9. 365 U.S. 167, 169 (1961).
10. Kates & Kouba, supra note 8, at 138.
II. Levin, supra note 4, at 1485 n. 6.
12. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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ing that cities are now to be included in the word "person" under section 1983
and can be held accountable for damages as well as equitable relief under some
circumstances.
The primary concern of this Note is to inquire into the factors that led to the
abandonment of the "nonperson" rule after nearly two decades of reaffirmance
and to consider the situations in which a city can be held accountable for viola-
tions of civil rights as opposed to those where the city still enjoys an immunity
from section 1983.
I. THE CASE
In this class action plaintiffs were female employees of two city agencies: the
New York City Board of Education and the New York City Department of
Social Services.13 The complaint challenged regulations that required pregnant
employees to take unpaid absences from their jobs even though the employees
were medically fit to continue employment.' 4 The plaintiffs contended that there
was also a "city-wide policy" of the city that required the leave of absence after an
employee was in her fifth month of pregnancy. However, each agency could
allow a two-month extension if a physician of the city approved the agency's
decision.' 5 The individual plaintiffs in the case at bar were compelled to relin-
quish theirjobs when in fact, their personal doctors would have permitted them
to continue employment for another month.' 6 The plaintiffs brought their action
under section 1983 against the city officials (heads of the agencies and the
Mayor) as well as against the city itseff praying for back pay awards and injunc-
tive relief. 7 Although a similar practice had been held unconstitutional in
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur'8 the year before the district court's
decision, the district court concluded that since the city's policy had been
changed before the decision in LaFleur, the equitable remedies were moot.' 9
Furthermore, plaintiff's claim for back pay was denied. Relying on Monroe, it
was concluded that because a city was absolutely immune from damages under
section 1983, plaintiffs could not alter the rule by bringing the action against the
Mayor or other city administrators when, in effect, the relief of back pay would
come out of the city treasury.20
On appeal the dismissal of plaintiff's action was affirmed. 2' In addressing the
section 1983 issue, the appellate court relied on Monroe in holding that the city
13. 394 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
14. 436 U.S. 658, 661 (1978).
15. Id., note 2.
16. 394 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
17. 436 U.S. 658, 660-661 (1978).
18. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
19. 394 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
20. Id. (The plaintiffs also relied on Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e). This claim was rejected by the district court. It was one of the grounds for the peti-
tion of certiorari; but the Supreme Court limited its grant of certiorari to the section 1983 claim; See
436 U.S. 658, 660 n.l (1978).
21. 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976).
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was not a "person." When plaintiffs conceded that the Department of Social
Services was not a "person" because of its direct connection to the city, but as-
serted that the Board of Education was a "person" because of its independence;
the court, in rejecting the distinction, stated, "We know of no rule of thumb that
may be deemed controlling on the question whether independent agencies are to
be considered 'persons' for the purposes of § 1983. ' 22 Reliance was placed upon
previous cases that had held certain agencies of the city to be "nonpersons" and
cases in which a particular agency had been held to be a "person" were either dis-
tinguished or rejected. 23 Concluding that Congress in amending Title VII in
1972 had seen fit to give a remedy to those discriminated against because of sex,
it was considered proper not to extend section 1983 to cover these facts. 24
Plaintiff's petition for certiorari was granted 25 to consider whether the
agencies or the officials were "persons" within the meaning of section 1983;26
a question that previously had been left open in Mt. Healthy City Board of
Education v. Doyle.27 The Supreme Court concluded that since it had deter-
mined numerous cases in which local school boards were defendants,28 the time
had come to overrule Monroe to the extent it granted absolute immunity to local
governmental units under section 1983.29 While affirming Monroe's holding that
a municipality could not be held responsible for the violation of constitutional
rights by its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior,30 the local
governments could be held liable under section 1983 for an unconstitutional
"policy" or "custom" practiced by the city without regard as to whether it was
implemented by statute, regulation, or administration decision. 3' Therefore,
since the act of dismissing plaintiffs from their employment because of their
degree of pregnancy was an "official policy" of the city and was a deprivation of a
constitutional right protected by section 1983, thejudgments of the lower courts
were reversed. 32
22. Id. at 263.
23. Id. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the officials could be subject to liability
because the damages would be paid by the city. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) was dis-
tinguished because there was no connection made that any of the administrators acted beyond the
scope of their authority. The court characterized the plaintiffs' contention as follows, "Appellants
would have us merge two discrete conceptions to award relief. They would have us entertain suit
against the official who committed an unconstitutional act, without malice, solely ex officio, even
though from the nature of the relief sought-back pay-an award must come out of the public treas-
ury of the Board of Education." This the court refused to do. Relying upon an analogy, the court
reasoned that since Congress had protected state treasuries with the Eleventh Amendment, Congress
had protected the cities with the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 532 F.2d 259, 265-266 (2d Cir. 1976).
24. 532 F.2d at 276.
25. 429 U.S. 1071 (1977) (No. 76-1914).
26. 436 U.S. 658, 662-663. (1978).
27. 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
28. 436 U.S. 658, 663 n. 5 (1978).
29. 436 U.S. at 663.
30. 436 U.S. at 663 n. 7.
31. 436 U.S. at 690-691.
32. Id. at 694-695.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Section 1983, in General
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was originally § I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.33 To
successfully recover under section 1983 certain requirements must be met: "First
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by
the 'constitution and laws' of the United States. Second, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right 'under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory." 34 In
addition, the defendant has to be a "person" not shielded by any form of
"immunity." 35
B. Supreme Court Decisions: Monroe, Moor, Kenosha, and Aldinger
In 1961 the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Monroe v. Pape.36
There the plaintiff brought an action under section 1983 seeking to hold indi-
vidual police officers and the city of Chicago liable for damages resulting from
an illegal entry into the plaintiff's home by the officers and a subsequent deten-
tion of plaintiff by the police. 37 After the initial holding that the complaint stated
cause of action against the individual police officers for their actions taken
"under color" of state law, the Supreme Court held further, "... we are of the
opinion that Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations with-
in the ambit of § 1979"38 [now section 1983]. Attention was focused on the
Sherman amendment 39 to the Civil Rights Act of 1871 that would have imposed
liability on cities and counties for acts of violence resulting in property dam-
age.40 Reasoning that since Congress had rejected the amendment, Justice
Douglas, speaking for the Supreme Court, concluded that subjecting cities to
damages under the statute ". . . was so antagonistic that we cannot believe that
the word 'person' was used in this particular Act to include them."4 1 In the foot-
note, Justice Douglas recognized that this view was shared by the lower courts
but that some cases had allowed equitable relief against a city.42 In promulgating
the "nonperson" rule for cities, one commentator suggested that the principle
was to provide a uniform application of the word "person" in section 1983 ac-
tions. 43
33. See generally Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60
N. W. L. REV. 277 (1975-76).
34. Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 150 (1970).
35. Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1975).
36. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See generally Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REV.
40, 211-216 (1961-62).
37. 365 U.S. at 169.
38. Id. at 187.
39. CONG. GLOBE, 42 Cong., 1st Sess. 633 (1871).
40. 365 U.S. at 188 n. 38 (1961).
41. Id. at 191. Cf. Comment, Toward State and Municipal Liability in Damages for Denial of
Racial Equal Protection, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1142, 1165-1166 (1969).
42. I. 365 U.S. at 191 n. 50.
43. Comment, Suing Public Entities under the Federal Civil Rights Act: Monroe v. Pape Recon-
sidered, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 107.
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In the years following the Monroe decision, section 1983 was a central tool in
protecting constitutional rights. But as the litigation increased, the lower federal
courts were unsure how far the cities' immunity extended. An important issue
was whether the city should be granted immunity under section 1983 if state law
had abolished it. This issue was resolved by two Supreme Court opinions in
1973.44
The first was Moor v. County of Alameda45 where plaintiffs sought to recover
damages for injuries sustained from shotgun wounds because of the wrongful
acts of the defendant deputy sheriffs, employees of the defendant, county. 46 The
suit was brought in federal district court for both federal claims (section 1983
and section 1985) and state claims (California Torts Claims Act of 1963 which
allowed a county to be "vicariously liable" for the acts of its employees).47 Rely-
ing on Monroe, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's dismissal of the
complaints; thus, reaffirming the absolute immunity for a local governing body
under section 1983 even though the county was subject to suit under state law. 48
Furthermore, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's refusal to exercise
its discretion in entertaining the state law claims under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. 49 The leading case for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction, Mine
Workers v. Gibbs,50 was distinguished on the ground that even though the dis-
trict court in the present action had jurisdiction over the individual employees on
both the federal and state claims, to exercise the jurisdiction of the state claims
against the county would require an additional defendant, a factor not present in
Gibbs. In addition, considerations such as jury confusion and respect for the
state courts were emphasized in determining whether to exercise the jurisdic-
tion. 5'
The dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas, the author of Monroe, focused on
the "nonperson" rule. It was asserted that the counties should be considered as
"persons" for equitable relief, in spite of the fact that Monroe did have "over-
tones" to that effect. 52 But the majority construed the cause of action as one for
damages only. 53 Thus, the question of whether a local municipality was in-
cluded in the word "person" under section 1983 if the cause of action prayed for
only equitable relief and not damages remained subject to dispute.
However, the issue was resolved later in the 1973 term by City of Kenosha v.
Bruno.54 The plaintiffs, tavern-owners, brought a section 1983 action alleging
that the defendant-cities had violated their fourteenth amendment right of pro-
cedural due process by denying their right to renew their liquor-licenses without
44. Levin, supra note 4, at 1494-1495.
45. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
46. Id. at 695.
47. Id. at 696.
48. Id. at 709-710.
49. Id. at 717.
50. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
51. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 712-713 (1973).
52. Id. at 723.
53. Id. at 695 n. 2.
54. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
5
Bryant: Cities as Persons under 42 U.S.C. 1983: Monell v. Department of S
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1978
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
a proper hearing. The district court allowed the plaintiffs' equitable prayer in the
form of a declatoryjudgment and order requiring the city to grant the licenses. 55
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged the cases that had allowed equit-
able remedies as opposed to damages in section 1983 suits, this "bifurcated"
approach was rejected and it was held that the district court had no jurisdiction
to enforce the equitable claim. The conclusion was based on the Monroe analysis
of the legislative intent behind section 1983 without citing or reexamining the
history.56 Noteworthy was the fact that Justice Douglas, in dissent, reaffirmed
his position in Moor and urged that the equitable relief was not barred by sec-
tion 1983 because the language in Monroe to that effect was merely "dicta." 57
With the above issue resolved in favor of the cities in Kenosha, writers seized
on the second holding in Moor to assert the position that the Supreme Court
should expand the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in order for federal courts to
entertain suits under state law when the municipal immunity doctrine had been
waived by the state, even though the municipality was immune under section
1983.511 But any possibility of expansion was foreclosed by Aldinger v.
Howard.59 The plaintiff had alleged a violation of her due process rights when
she was dismissed from her county job without a hearing. In the section 1983
claim she sought an injunction and damages against the county and the county
officials. Relief was also grounded on state law.60 In affirming the dismissal of
the complaint the Supreme Court stated that, as to the pendant-party jurisdic-
tion, "[B]efore it can be concluded that such jurisdiction exists, a federal court
must satisfy itself not only that Art. III permits it, but that Congress in the
statutes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication negated its
existence."61
III. ANALYSIS
After the expansion of the "nonperson" doctrine and the closing of what
appeared to be all available "loopholes,"'6 2 new approaches were developed that
would affirm the central holding of Monroe, but alter the holding of absolute
immunity for local governments. One author, after distinguishing section 1983
"political cases" from "constitutional torts" contended:
From this rough dichotomy of the section 1983 case law, one can dis-
cern two corresponding theories on which a city or other governmental
55. Id. at 508.
56. id. at 513.
57. Id. at 516. See Comment, Federal Jurisdiction-Municipal Immunity under the Civil Rights
Act-Closing the Loopholes, 52 N. C. L. REV. 1289, 1298-1301 (1974-75).
58. See Note, The Municipaity, Section 1983 and Pendent Jurisdiction, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 110
(1970). (In urging the adoption of pendant jurisdiction, the author notes that since 1958 many states
have begun to abolish the distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" acts, thus allowing
cities to be held liable for the torts of its employees).
59. 427 U.S. 1(1978). See Note, Municipal Law: Expanding Damage Remedies in Federal Court
of Municipal Deprivation of Constitutional Rights, 30 OKA. L. REV. 944, 947 (1977).
60. 427 U.S. at 4.
61. Id. at 18.
62. See note 57 supra.
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entity might be held liable. In "political" section 1983 cases-those that
attack an allegedly unconstitutional government policy-the ration-
ale for municipal liability would be clear: the plaintiff would simply
show that he had been injured, that his injuries were fairly attributable
to a government policy, and that the policy was unconstitutional.
Alternatively in a constitutional tort action a plaintiff might attempt
to sue a city on the basis of the personal liability created by Monroe
and its progeny. The plaintiff's theory would be that, under the doctrine
of respondeat superior, a municipality should be vicariously liable for
the constitutional torts its officers commit within the scope of their em-
ployment regardless of whether the particular acts reflect official policy.
This article suggests that the leading precedents on municipal im-
munity are read most sensibly to protect cities only from the constitu-
tional tool category of suits, which would impose vicarious liability. In
a political case, where the city itself causes the constitutional injury,
courts should not favor injunctive or declaratory relief over monetary
relief. If damages are appropriate to redress an unconstitutional policy,
the municipal immunity doctrine of section 1983 should not be inter-
preted to stand in the way.63
In overruling Monroe, insofar as it held cities were not "persons," but affirm-
ing Monroe's holding that cities could not be held liable under the respondeat
superior theory, it can be argued that Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of City of
N. y.64 embraces this view. 65
At the threshold of his analysis, Justice Brennan, writing for the Supreme
Court, reexamined the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and the
refusal by Congress to adopt the Sherman amendment; the factor that he termed
the "sole basis" for Monroe's holding that cities were not "persons" for section
1983.66 Various commentators on the legislative intent had asserted that the
conclusion in Monroe was incorrect.67
The opinion notes that H. R. 320, the bill in which Congress was to exercise
its powers under the fourteenth amendment contained four sections. Section
1983 was originally section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and passed without
amendments. But sections 2 through 4 were more controversial. 68 The Sherman
amendment was "not" part of section I but was added as a separate section
and when rejected by the House, was sent to a joint committee. The original
amendment did not place liability on the cities or counties, but on the individual
citizens. 69
63. Levin, supra note 4, at 1490-1491.
64. 436 U.S. 658.
65. Id. at 707 (Powell, J., concurring).
66. 436 U.S. at 664.
67. Kates & Kouba, supra note 8, at 132-136.
68. 436 U.S. at 665.
69. AI.
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However, in redrafting the amendment, the conference committee subjected
the local governments to damages if the individual defendant was unable to
make the injured party whole. The amendment's purpose was to require prop-
erty to be subject to the damages caused by the Ku Klux Klan with the result
that the property owners who would be subject to the increases in taxes would
take steps to prevent Klan violence. 70 Because this first conference substitute was
rejected, a second conference redrafted the report and this substitute was en-
acted and is presently 42 U.S.C.§ 1986.71 The Supreme Court concluded,
"[B]ecause § I of the Civil Rights Act does not state expressly that municipal
corporations come within its ambit, it is finally necessary to interpret § I to con-
firm that such corporations were indeed intended to be included within the
'persons' to whom that section applies.".72
This conclusion was based on the debates of the first conference substitute.7 3
In the debates the opponents of the Sherman amendment centered on the ques-
tion of whether Congress could, within the bounds of the Constitution, impose
such an obligation on local governments; 74 the opponents asserting that the
Constitution prohibited the national government from imposing the duty of
keeping the peace on cities and counties since that obligation was left to the
states.7 5 In reviewing the precedents relied upon by the opponents, the opinion
acknowledged the fact that their views expressed the theories expounded by the
Supreme Court during that period; but concluded that the opponents' grounds
did not preclude the fact that cities could be persons under section 1983. This
holding was based on the fact that even the opponents conceded that cities could
constitutionally be held liable for their contractual obligations, thus distinguish-
ing between obligations to provide protection and subjecting a local government
to damages when the city or county was required by the state to maintain order,
but had breeched this duty and violated the fourteenth amendment.7 6 The
Supreme Court reasoned further that the Federalism doctrine did not prevent
suits against cities for their violations of Constitutional rights since cities were
required to satisfy violations of the Contract Clause from their treasuries; and
moreover, there was no Congressional intent to exempt cities from section 1 of
the Civil Rights Act. 77
In reviewing the debates on section 1, the opinion proceeded to inquire as to
whether section I was intended to exclude cities because they were "artificial"
persons. First, noting that this remedial section was not limited to blacks but
included every "person" and was to be liberally construed by the courts,8 it was
concluded that there was no justification for granting cities total exemption
70. Id. at 667 n. 16.
71. 436 U.S. at 669.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 673.
75. Id. at 680.
76. Id. at 678-680.
77. Id. at 680-681.
78. Id. at.684.
8
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under section 1 since cities, like "natural persons," could violate civil rights
by their own actions.7 9 This outcome was supported by the debates. For ex-
ample, when section I was drafted it was partially in response to a case in which a
city had unconstitutionally taken property, thus coming within the statute.80 In
addition, was the factor that at the time of the debates corporations were re-
garded as "persons" and cities had been included within this rule.8' Finally,
Congress had enacted the Dictionary Act,8 2 that included in the word "person"
the phrase, "'bodies politic and corporate.' "83 From this reconsideration of the
legislative intent relied upon by Monroe, the Supreme Court held that local
governmental units were now "persons" within the meaning of section 1983 and
were subject to suit for damages and equitable relief-if the actions taken by the
municipalities derived from either an "official policy," shown by regulations,
statutes, or decisions; or informal "customs" practiced by the local govern-
ment.
4
In the second major portion of the majority opinion, the Supreme Court,
relying on the same statements made by the Congressmen in the previous review
of the legislative history, concluded that there was no Congressional intent to
hold a city liable under the theory of respondeat superior.85 Interpreting the
language of section 1983, the Supreme Court stated that to be held liable for the
deprivation of civil rights-the city had to have caused the injury by its adminis-
trative actions and not merely because of an "employer-employee relation-
ship." 86 There was reluctance to incorporate the vicarious liability rule into the
federal law and an awareness of the competing policy reasons concerning the
rule. The considerations in favor of vicarious liability were rejected since they
were the same justifications rejected by Congress in the vote on the Sherman
amendment. 87 Therefore it was concluded that a local government was not
responsible for the constitutionl torts of its "employees or agents.""8
Guidance for interpreting this portion of the Court's holding, that the city
must have caused the deprivation of the constitutional right, was given by the
79. Id. at 687.
80. Id., See Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet, 243 (1834).
81. 436 U.S. at 687-689.
82. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, Ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.
83. 436 U.S. at 688-689. But see (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (the inquiry into the word "person"
began with an analysis of the Dictionary Act and not the Sherman Amendment. He stated, "The Act
expressly provides that corporations need not be included within the scope of the word 'person'
where the context suggests a more liberal reach." Rehnquist notes that one of the main purposes of
the Dictionary Act was not to mistakenly extend the right to vote to women, 436 U.S. at 719-720).
84. 436 U.S. at 690-691. (The opinion relied on Adikes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
167-168 (1970) in which the Supreme Court included "custom" because a practice could be so wide-
spread that it had the force of an official written policy). (The opinion concluded that the tenth
amendment was not in conflict with this holding; nor was the eleventh amendment because "Our
holding today is, of course, limited to local government units which are not considered part of the
State for Eleventh Amendment purposes," 436 U.S. at 690 n. 54).
85. 436 U.S. at 691.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 694.
88. Id.
9
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reference to Rizzo v. Goode.8 9 Commenting upon Rizzo, the Court added in a
footnote, ".. . we would appear to have decided that the mere right to control
without any control or direction having been exercised and without any failure
to supervise is not enough to support § 1983 liability. . ...90
Despite this valuable insight, the Supreme Court was not as instructive in giv-
ing guidance on other issues; most importantly, the question of "qualified im-
munity." In reversing the judgments of the lower courts, it was stated that the
decision was only a "sketch" of a local government's liability under section 1983
and that ". . . we expressly leave further developments of this action to another
day."9' Although clear that a city could no longer rely on "absolute immunity,' 92
in Part IV of the majority opinion, the issue of whether a city was to retain a
"qualified immunity" was left open.93 Since reliance was on Scheuer v. Rhodes94
to support the rejection of absolute immunity, an inference can be drawn that the
test used in Scheuer will be applied to cities as well as city officials. Powell's con-
curring opinion supported this assumption by the contention that in the case of
an official, liability may be imposed if there is no "qualified immunity" and
that the majority's holding extends this rule ". . . to a local government when
implementation of its official policies or established customs inflicts constitu-
tional injury."95
As to whether the instant holding reversed the facts of Monroe, or the other
cases following the "nonperson" rule, the opinion expressly declined to give any
indication; with the exception of upholding Kenosha's rejection of the "bi-
89. 423 U.S. 362 (1976). (The plaintiffs instituted a class action under section 1983 against city
officials alleging that the officials were responsible for a pattern of constitutional violations by city
police officers. But the Court stated, "[A]s the facts developed, there was no affirmative link between
the occurrence of the various incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or
policy by petitioners-express or otherwise-showing their authorization or approval of such mis-
conduct," 423 U.S. at 371).
90. 436 U.S. at 694.
91. 436 U.S. at 695.
92. Id. at 700.
93. Id. at 701.
94. 416 U.S. 232 (1974). (Where parents of students killed at Kent State brought a section 1983
action against the Governor of Ohio, the Adjutant General of the National Guard, various officers of
the National Guard, enlisted members of the National Guard, and the college president of Kent State
University, the Supreme Court held that the eleventh amendment did not bar suits against the state
officials under the authority of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and there was not an absolute
immunity for the state officials; but only a qualified immunity. On the issue of the executive immuni-
ty the Court stated, "... a qualified immunity is available to officers of the Executive branch of gov-
ernment, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office
and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which the liability
is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in
light of all the circumstances coupled with good-faith belief that affords a basis for qualified immun-
ity. 416 U.S. at 247-248). See also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (Immunity of school
board members). See generally, Fullwood, Immunity under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 7 N. C. CENT.
L. J. 39 (1975-76).
95. 436 U.S. at 707-708. (Powell, J. concurring) (Justice Powell further stated that had the
absolute immunity of a city been affirmed;eventually, the Supreme Court would be faced with an
issue as to whether a plaintiff could invoke his action directly from the fourteenth amendment under
the theory of Bivins v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 436 U.S. at 712).
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furcated" approach. 96 Applying the holding of Monell that the liability of the
city cannot be based "solely" on the theory of respondeat superior,97 absent any
showing of "policy" or "custom" employed by the city of Chicago that permitted
its officers to resort to illegal searches and seizures in investigating crimes and
therefore causing the violation of the victim's constitutional rights; the outcome
of Monroe would be the same.
In addition, the decision was lacking in any discussion of policies for or
against municipal liability. Justice Brennan noted the fact Monroe also refused
to consider policy arguments. 99 In Monroe it was argued that the cities should
be liable ". . . because municipal liability will not only afford plaintiffs respon-
sible defendants but cause those defendants to eradicate abuses that exist at the
police level."' 00 These arguments have been repeated by commentators; for
instance, one writer brought attention to the fact that even though there was a
newly discovered right to have grievances heard in the federal courts after
Monroe, the "nonperson" doctrine often denied any form of relief unless the
individual defendant was able to satisfy the judgment; which in turn, created
numerous decisions on various forms of immunity.' 0' Because the burden
usually fell on the innocent plaintiff, it was urged that placing the loss on the
local government would be more equitable since the city or countycould spread
the loss among the taxpayers. 0 2 A further assertion was that the cities would be
protected by the jury trial since juries favor cities over minorities (the most com-
mon plaintiffs in cases under section 1983).103 Among the arguments advanced
for not imposing liability on the municipality was that an individual officer
would not be deterred from violating constitutional rights if he or she knew the
employer would be ultimately responsible. 04 Also was the contention that cities,
in obtaining liability insurance, have had the right to rely on the "nonperson"
rule of Monroe. 05 The argument is weakened by the fact that cities are subject
to suit in state courts 10 6 and can also be subject to suits under the general federal
question jurisiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, provided the requirements of diversity
of citizenship and of the amount of controversy are established. 107
96. 436 U.S. at 701 n. 66.
97. 436 U.S. at 701.
98. For an example of cases following the "nonperson" rule; but also refusing to impose vicari-
ous liability; See Lyle v. Village of Golden Valley, 310 F. Supp. 852 (D.C. Minn 1970). For an ex-
ample of cases that followed the "nonperson" rule; but which alleged an unconstitutional policy; See
Black Brothers Combined, etc. v. City of Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 147 (E. D. Va. 1974).
99. 436 U.S. at 664 n. 8.
100. 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961) (Footnotes omitted).
101. Katton, Knocking on Wood, Some Thoughts on the hnmunities of State .ficials to Civil
Rights Damage Actions, 30 VAND. L. REV. 941, 955-956 (1977).
102. Kates & Kouba, supra note 8, at 138-139.
103. Hundt, Suing Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 N. W. L. REV.
770, 797 (1975-76).
104. /d., at 783.
105. 436 U.S. at 717. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
106. See note 58 supra.
107. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 516 (1973) (Brennan. Jr.. concurring). Seegen-
erallv Bodensteiner, Federal Court Jurisdiction of Suits Against "Nonpersons "'for Deprivation of
Constitutional Rights, 8 VAL. U. L. REV. 215 (1973-74); Note, Damage Remedies against Municipal-
ities for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REv. 922 (1975-76).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although Monell has abolished the absolute immunity doctrine for munici-
palities in section 1983 actions, plaintiffs are still precluded from holding local
governments vicariously liable for the actions of their employees; and as a con-
sequence, those injured may still be left without a remedy if the individual em-
ployee is not made to compensate for the violation of the right protected by the
Constitution. However, Monell has altered the Monroe holding when the city
has been shown to have caused the deprivation by its "official actions." The most
important issue left unresolved is that of "qualified immunity." The questions of
whether cities and counties will be given the same degree of qualified immunity
as their officials or whether that degree will be of different dimensions will be
developed in the lower federal courts. In formulating the new contours of
qualified immunity for municipalities the assistance of briefs and arguments
from counsel representing section 1983 litigants will be invaluable.
STEVEN F. BRYANT
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